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SPEEDING IN REVERSE: AN ANECDOTAL VIEW
OF WHY VICTIM IMPACT TESTIMONY




It seems appropriate to end this conference with the story of how
it began-with the story of Shanan Ardis. The State of South Carolina
prosecuted Shanan for the capital murder of his father. John Blume,
Bill Nettles, and I represented him, and Dr. Seymour Halleck, who
ultimately testified very powerfully in Shanan's defense, diagnosed
him. It was during Shanan's capital sentencing proceeding that Dr.
Halleck and I started talking about the impact prosecuting Shanan
would have on the surviving family members. Dr. Halleck mentioned
that, as a psychiatrist, he thought the death penalty was generally
harmful to victims' family members. He explained that while its
harmfulness was more immediately apparent in cases involving in-
trafamilial homicides, such as Shanan's murder of his father, the
death penalty also tended to damage family members in stranger-
homicide cases because of its effects on the grieving process. He then
casually mentioned that a professional organization to which he once
belonged had contemplated publicly opposing the death penalty for
those very effects on victims' family members. With Dr. Halleck's
comments, the idea for this symposium was born, for it seemed to me
that the common wisdom-that the death penalty was for the benefit
of surviving victims-was wholly at odds with psychiatric insight.
The Ardis case is not an extraordinary one, but neither is it typi-
cal. ' The victim-family dynamics in the Ardis case are idiosyncratic, or
at least peculiar to intrafamilial homicide cases. Nonetheless, the
story has several broad and powerful lessons related to victim impact
testimony. It has shaped many of my own views; so, I will tell the story,
explain those broad lessons, and let you be the judge.
t Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
I There is no reported decision in this case.
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I
THE CAPITAL MURDER PROSECUTION OF SHANAN ARDIS
Shanan Ardis was twenty-one years old when he killed his father,
Jeff Ardis. The homicide was neither clean nor quick. Shanan had
lived in Louisiana with his mother for most of his life, but as a young
adult he moved to South Carolina to work construction jobs. There
he lived with his father and his father's girlfriend, Linda Timmerman.
After a day of heavy drinking, Shanan came home and stabbed his
father from behind. Over the course of several hours, he held his
wounded father and his father's girlfriend captive with a knife, taunt-
ing them and refusing to allow them to call 9-1-1. Finally, Shanan
forced Linda to crawl upstairs, unlock a case, and remove from it a
gun, which he then used to shoot his father. The police arrested
Shanan minutes after he left his father's home. While in jail awaiting
trial, Shanan was charged with assisting another inmate in committing
suicide. Although the State did not dispute that the inmate wanted to
kill himself and sought Shanan's assistance, this second homicide also
was not pretty; Shanan was accused of strangling the inmate to death
with a sock. To make matters worse for Shanan, this case occurred in
Lexington County, South Carolina, a suburb with a much higher
death-sentence rate, even, than Harris County, Texas.2
Knowing only these facts, it is easy to see why lead counsel, John
Blume, sought to retain Dr. Halleck's services. To put it mildly, there
was some explaining to do. In fact, as Dr. Halleck uncovered, there
was a powerful explanation: paranoid schizophrenia, with religious
delusions. Shanan was probably genetically predisposed to this ex-
treme mental illness, and his social history both shaped and acceler-
ated its effects; he had a past which included child abuse, a mentally
ill mother, and religious upbringing in a cult. Moreover, each of
these contributing factors pointed to Shanan's father as the most
likely target of Shanan's violent impulses. First, as a young child, both
of Shanan's teenaged, intensely unhappy parents had repeatedly sub-
jected him to physical abuse. Second, his mother Anita, who suffered
from borderline personality disorder, constantly primed Shanan to
hate and fear his father and even failed either to discourage or report
Shanan's fantasies of killing his father. And third, the millenialist cult
to which Shanan and his mother belonged strongly condemned
nonmarital sexual relationships, such as the one Shanan's father en-
joyed with his live-in girlfriend. Indeed, Shanan's mother urged him
to view this relationship as adulterous, despite her divorce from his
2 My colleague, Theodore Eisenberg, confirmed this claim by analyzing data from
the Bureau of Justice Statistics' database Capital Punishment in the United States, the FBI's
Supplementaiy Homicide Reports, and James S. Liebman's A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital
Cases, 1973-1995. The analysis is on file with the Cornell Law Review.
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father, because she claimed that in God's eyes, Shanan's father was
still married to her.
Obviously, these facts regarding Shanan's family were crucial to
mounting his penalty phase defense, but their centrality was not lim-
ited to how well they complemented Dr. Halleck's diagnosis. Equally
important was their bizarre refraction through the lens of victim im-
pact testimony. From the time my co-counsel, John Blume, was as-
signed to the case to the moment the court imposed its sentence, the
prospect of victim impact testimony shaped, or perhaps more accu-
rately, warped, trial strategy.
The first question to arise was who "counted" as a family mem-
ber.3 The solicitor tried to position the long-term girlfriend as Jeff s
common-law wife, a contention the defense disputed. If she were not
Jeff s "wife," then his nearest kin-other than Shanan himself, the vic-
tim's only child-were his siblings and parents. Blume had worked
hard at developing a relationship with Jeff s family, mostly with one
brother, Gene Ardis, who acted as the spokesman. From very early
on, it was obvious that Linda desperately wanted the death penalty,
but the rest of the family members were initially hesitant to take a
position and over time came to lean away from lethal injection;
Shanan was, after all, also their kin. So the question of Linda's status
was important, and on this matter Shanan was lucky: Although Jeff
and Linda lived together and dated exclusively for years, they did not
hold themselves out as married, as is generally required for common-
law marriage in South Carolina.4
Second, there was the question of who, if anyone, would hear the
preferences of the victim's family members. In South Carolina, if a
jury hangs in the penalty phase, the defendant receives a life sen-
tence.5 As a result, normally there are very strong incentives to try
death penalty cases before juries. "All" the lawyers have to do is to
convince one juror out of twelve to hold firm to the view that a life
sentence is more appropriate than death. Moreover, in South Caro-
3 See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1520 (Law. Co-op Supp. 2001) (including in the Victim's
Bill of Rights "the family members of a ... homicide victim").
4 See, e.g., Barker v. Baker, 499 S.E.2d 503, 506-07 (S.C. 1998) (stating that a com-
mon-law marriage exists "if the parties intend to enter into a marriage contract," and not-
ing that proof of such an intention typically entails a showing that the parties "publicly
held themselves out as husband and wife"). South Carolina law also happened to exclude
from the sentencing proceeding the view of someone who did not want a death sentence
imposed. Although the solicitor relied in part on the jailhouse killing for his proof of
aggravation in the murder ofJeff Ardis, the views of that victim's mother-who adamantly
opposed the death penalty-were irrelevant under the statute.
5 See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C) (b) ("If members of the jury after a reasonable
deliberation cannot agree on a recommendation as to whether or not the death sentence
should be imposed ... the trial judge shall dismiss such jury and shall sentence the defen-
dant to life imprisonment...").
2003]
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lina the public overwhelmingly supports the death penalty, 6 and this
same public elects judges. Therefore, judges have an incentive to im-
pose death sentences thatjuries do not.7 In this case, however, ajury
trial also came with a substantial disadvantage. If the victim's family
wanted a death sentence, the factfinder, whether judge or jury, would
hear their testimony and would be able to infer their wishes. But if, as
in this case, the family did not want a death sentence, then the jury
would never know, for South Carolina courts, as well as those of most
other jurisdictions,8 do not permit family members to express an ulti-
mate view on the sentence; no vehicle exists to clue the jury as to what
the family wanted. A judge, however, would be allowed to hear the
family's wishes. A judge in any jurisdiction might have informal
knowledge of the victim's family's wishes. But in South Carolina the
judge would be certain to know because the statute provides that
when a judge determines the sentence, he or she must permit victim
family members to submit a statement. Accordingly, we employed a
strategy that, absent the victim impact considerations, would be idi-
otic: We decided to try the case in front of the judge.
Both parties, however, must agree to waive ajury trial, and for the
same reasons we wanted a bench trial, the solicitor did not. In this
case, we could circumvent his refusal by a guilty plea, which does not
require the solicitor's consent, and which results in judge sentencing.9
Thus, victim impact considerations also drove the decision to plead
guilty. Because the evidence of guilt was uncontestable, that decision
was not as hard as it might be in other cases.
Before the start of the sentencing proceeding, the Ardis family-
Jeff s parents and brother Gene-signed a letter addressed to the
judge stating that they did not want Shanan to receive a death sen-
tence. One might then assume that the views of victim family mem-
bers would have little impact from that point on, but such an
assumption would be wildly wrong. Linda Timmerman's initial testi-
mony, admissible not as victim impact testimony but as a description
of the crime, was extended, extremely emotional, and described a sub-
stantially more aggravated crime (in terms of the length of time
Shanan kept Jeff and Linda hostage, the extent ofJeff s suffering, and
6 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Deadly Paradox of Capital Jurors, 90 S. CAL. L.
REV. 371, 380 tbl.1 (2001).
7 See generally Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death:
Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759
(1995) (explaining the link between politics and the death penalty); Stuart Taylor, Jr., The
Politics qf Hanging Judges, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 30, 1995, at 25 (articulating the same
proposition).
8 SeeJohn Blume, Ten Years of Payne: Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Cases, 88 COR-
NELL L. REV. 257, 276 tbl.2 (2003).
9 See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(B).
[Vol. 88:555
SPEEDING IN REVERSE
the seriousness of the threat to her own life) than did her earlier state-
ments. It was clear what penalty she wanted., Nonetheless, I did not
cross-examine her on her exaggeration or inconsistencies. Instead, I
pursued only two brief lines of questioning. First, I wanted to estab-
lish that her relationship with Jeff was not truly spousal; that she and
Jeff had not actually lived together for very long, that the house they
lived in was in his name only, and that they had not held themselves
out as married. The second area of questioning concerned Jeff s feel-
ings about his son; that Jeff loved Shanan and wanted the best for
him.
As Linda was testifying to her dramatic and horrible story, an-
other smaller story was playing out in the courtroom. South Carolina
law provides for a Victim Assistance Program, 10 and a representative
of that office sat with the Ardis family throughout the trial."a It
seemed obvious to us that the Victim Assistance Program office was
less than neutral in this case, if it is neutral in any case, and we feared
that the "assistant" was trying to convince the family to ask for death.
Thus, in deciding what to ask Dr. Halleck when he took the
stand, we were reluctant to have him cast Jeff in a negative light, fear-
ing that it might aid the victim assistant's efforts to pressure the family
to ask for death, or at least to retract their written statement that they
were not seeking death. Indeed, during the direct examination of Dr.
Halleck, John deliberately steered far away from the physical abuse
Shanan had suffered at the hands of his father. But on cross-examina-
tion, when the solicitor questioned Dr. Halleck as to why the illness he
described would prompt violence toward a father who was, at the time
of the crime, treating Shanan in a generous and loving way, Dr. Hal-
leck had to tell the truth. In one sentence, he said that Jeff, as a
young father, had been "brutal" toward Shanan.
That was enough. We cringed, and saw the victim assistant whis-
pering furiously to Gene Ardis. Then, at the next recess, the assistant
pulled Gene outside for a conference with the solicitor. At that point,
we feared that Gene would agree to be a witness for the prosecution
and ask for the death of our client. Meanwhile, on our own side of
the courtroom, we were worried about another possible recruit to the
solicitor's cause. That possible recruit was Shanan's own mother,
Anita, who threatened that if the social worker said anything critical of
her or her mothering, she would get up on the stand and ask for her
son Shanan's death. Technically, she had no right to voice her prefer-
ences, but if she approached the solicitor, it would be very difficult to
10 See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1410.
11 That office was created by a legislator whose sister was a murder victim; the sister's




predict to what facts she might have testified, and what the impact
would have been. We will never know, because we decided against
presenting the facts about Antia's own mental illness and how it led to
bizarre patterns of neglect and emotional abuse of her son. Of
course, we will also never know if she would have carried out her
threat, but we do know that she went home to Louisiana immediately
after the last witness testified, apparently less interested in whether the
court sentenced her son to death than what was said about her.
It did not surprise us when Gene Ardis took the stand in the pros-
ecution's rebuttal case. However, what he said did surprise us, and in
all likelihood, surprised everyone in the courtroom. The beginning of
his testimony was probably much as scripted. He talked about what a
fine person his brother Jeff was and how any charge of brutality to-
ward Shanan was a lie. Then he talked about how he missed his
brother and of the sadness that he and all of his family felt. He spoke
of the pain his mother felt in losing her son, and her grandson, and
how she could not even talk about it. But then, instead of asking for
Shanan's death, his testimony ended abruptly with this statement:
"But now, my thoughts turn to Shanan and I can't help but think of
what will happen to him, and that we love him too." The courtroom
was silent. There was no cross-examination.
After closing arguments and an overnight recess, I walked up to
Gene Ardis and told him thatjudges usually allow a family member to
speak to the defendant after sentence is pronounced, but that Shanan
was effectively alone in the courtroom because his mother and sister
had, the night before, left the state. I asked Gene if he would con-
sider speaking to Shanan after the judge pronounced the sentence,
and Gene said he would.
After what seemed like an incredibly long fifty minutes, during
which the judge orally reviewed and evaluated all the evidence, in-
cluding a terrible stretch when he explained why he was rejecting Dr.
Halleck's diagnosis, the judge sentenced Shanan to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole. I stood there convinced the sentence
was due to the victim's family members' wishes, while John brought
Gene Ardis to speak to his nephew Shanan before they took him away
for the rest of his life.
II
REFLECTIONS ON VICTIM IMPACT
Shanan, who is now on anti-psychotic medication, may spend the
rest of his life trying to unravel this story. I draw from Shanan's story
two less common arguments against admitting victim impact testi-
mony, and two improvements I think would be significant, assuming
[Vol. 88:555
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arguments for abolition-or at least abolition of victim impact testi-
mony-do not prevail.
A. Who Is the Driver?
Professor Beloof makes an extended argument supporting victim
family members' interest in stating their sentencing preferences.' 2 In
so doing, he relies upon historical rights of victim participation. The
problem with this argument, however, is that it leaps far too quickly
from the victim to the victim's family members. Putting aside the
question of whether victims should have a recognized right to speak,
the obvious problem in homicide cases is that they cannot. Beloof
assumes that the next best thing is for the victims' family members to
speak for the victims.' 3 Next best to a historically recognized right,
however, does not always support the creation of another right, a pro-
position the Supreme Court made crystal clear in another substituted
judgment case, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.14
In Cruzan, the petitioners contended that an incompetent person
has the same right to refuse medical treatment as does a competent
person. 15 The Court rightly observed that this formulation of the
claim begs the question because "[a] n incompetent person is not able
to make an informed and voluntary choice to exercise a hypothetical
right to refuse treatment or any other right."'16 Obviously, this state-
ment applies equally to dead victims! To the contention that the Con-
stitution required Missouri to accept the "substituted judgment" of
close family members concerning the removal of life support to Nancy
Cruzan, the Supreme Court responded that "the Due Process Clause
[does not] require[ ] the State to repose judgment on these matters
with anyone but the patient herself."'17 The Court explained that
"there is no automatic assurance that the view of close family members
will necessarily be the same as the patient's would have been had she
been confronted with the prospect of her situation while
competent."'18
12 See Douglas E. Beloof, Constitutional Implications of Crime Victims as Participants, 88
CORNELL L. REv. 282 (2003).
13 See id.
14 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
15 Id. at 279.
16 Id. at 280. The Court then held that a State may apply a "clear and convincing
evidence" standard in determining what, if any, wishes the incompetent person, while still
competent, had expressed concerning cessation of artificial food and hydration. Id. at
286-87. Obviously, no victim impact evidence, as we know it, contemplates any such deter-
mination of what the victim would have wanted, nor do I think Professor Beloof is contem-
plating such a determination.




Perhaps Shanan's case did not inspire this constitutional compar-
ison. It does, however, illuminate the non-constitutional question of
whether allowing such "substituted judgment" is good policy for the
states. Intrafamilial homicide cases are the perfect vehicle for observ-
ing that the victim, if given a choice, might have been desperately
opposed to a death sentence; yet, his or her family members might
want death equally desperately. To me, it seems certain thatJeffArdis
would not have wanted the State to execute his son; his girlfriend
Linda, however, had no similar or significant ties to Shanan. None-
theless, had Linda and Jeff been married, her voice would have been
the one that the judge heard and counted. 19 Such different loyalties
are not uncommon in intrafamilial homicide cases, but they can also
occur in stranger-homicides, in which the surviving family members
may not share the victim's own view about the death penalty. In sev-
eral states there have been campaigns to get private citizens to sign
"'jjn]ot in my name'" cards, or some form of notarized statement indi-
cating that if the signatory is murdered, he or she asks the state not to
seek the death penalty.2° Obviously, the prosecutor is not bound to
honor such a request, but perhaps less obviously, neither does it bind
a relative delivering victim impact testimony.
More commonly (indeed, even more commonly than in cases of
incompetent patients and continuation of life-sustaining treatment), a
murder victim may never have contemplated that he might be mur-
dered and whether he would like the death penalty visited upon his
murderer. Moreover, even those ordinary people 2' who contem-
plated such contingencies are unlikely to have communicated such
thoughts to family members. Thus, the victim's family may often be
forced to guess at what the victim would have wished, or they may
simply substitute their own wishes.
Different relatives, however, may come to different conclusions,
both on the question of the victim's likely wishes and on the matter of
their own preferences. Linda Timmerman had a different view than
did Gene Ardis, and Jeff's parents probably had less well-defined views
than either Linda or Gene. One could respond that the state should
present the full variety, but at least under Payne v. Tennessee,22 a bal-
anced view is impossible. Because victim impact testimony may not
include overt statements of the family members' sentencing desires,
jurors ordinarily will not hear family members who oppose the death
penalty. Indeed, death-seeking family members are free to recount, in
19 See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1510(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2001) (including a spouse
within the definition of a victim allowed to speak).
20 See, e.g., Jillian Lloyd, Activists Promote Pocket-Size Protest over Death Penalty, CHRISTIAN
SCL MONriOR, Dec. 29, 1998, at 2.
21 In this respect at least, lawyers may not be ordinary people.
22 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
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testimony that the jury will likely understand as a plea for death, the
characteristics of their loved one, their own suffering, and even the
suffering of those family members who oppose a death sentence in
testimony that the jury will likely understand as a plea for death. After
all, common sense tells the juror that if a family member did not want
the death penalty, he or she would not agree to testify in the sentenc-
ing phase.
Thus, victim impact testimony may contradict the victim's wishes
and run roughshod over the wishes of some of the victim's family
members. Even when it does not do so, the likelihood that victim
impact testimony will produce these irrational outcomes argues
against admitting such evidence.
B. Look Ma, No Hands!
In Booth v. Maryland, the U.S. Supreme Court excluded victim im-
pact testimony on the ground that such evidence diverts the jury's at-
tention away from its proper focus: the defendant's moral
culpability. 23 To assess that culpability requires attention to the defen-
dant's background, his record, and the circumstances of the crime,
but not to the relative worth of the victim. 24 As John Blume discusses
at greater length in his article, 25 South Carolina v. Gathers affirms the
Court's recognition of the appropriate focus of the sentencing deter-
mination. Underscoring the distinction between defendant culpabil-
ity and victim worth, the Court noted that "the content of the various
[religious] papers the victim happened to be carrying when he was
attacked was purely fortuitous and cannot provide any information
relevant to [Gathers's] moral culpability. '26 The Court's subsequent
decision in Payne does not overrule the Booth/Gathers determination
that victim impact evidence is irrelevant in assessing blameworthiness,
but it demurs that blameworthiness is not the sole legitimate factor in
the capital sentencing determination. Indeed, the Court noted that
assessment of harm is a second "important concern of the criminallaw... in determining the appropriate punishment."27 According to
the Court, "there is nothing unfair about allowing the jury to bear in
mind [the harm caused by the defendant] at the same time as it con-
siders the mitigating evidence introduced by the defendant. 28
I am no expert on substantive criminal law, so perhaps the Payne
Court's reasoning has more force than I apprehend. Be that as it may,
23 482 U.S. 496, 504-05 (1987), overruled by Payne, 501 U.S. at 830.
24 Id.
25 See Blume, supra note 8, at 260-62.
26 490 U.S. 805, 812 (1989), overruled by Payne, 501 U.S. at 830.
27 501 U.S. at 819.
28 Id. at 826.
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the experience of defending Shanan Ardis leads me to borrow the
Court's own tactic and demur to its rhetorical contention. Even as-
suming harm is a legitimate factor in the calculus of ultimate punish-
ment, the cost of introducing victim impact testimony into the
calculus of capital trial strategy seems enormous. True, the strategic
choice to withhold Shanan's entire social history in response to his
mother's threat to ask for the death penalty is a scenario unlikely to be
precisely replicated in another case. However, the decision not to
fully explore Shanan's history with his father is far more representa-
tive of capital cases, and it reveals that strategic calculations about vic-
tim impact testimony will often deprive the factfinder of information
that may help explain the offense or the offender. In such cases, de-
fense counsel must weigh the benefits of introducing relevant evi-
dence against the risk that the evidence might induce the
introduction of victim impact testimony. In intrafamilial homicides,
for example, the reason for such strategizing is obvious. Frequently,
the victim played an unflattering role in the defendant's social history,
and defense counsel accurately portraying that role may lead to mem-
bers of the victim's family retaliating through victim impact testimony.
In acquaintance and stranger homicides, the trade-off may be less ob-
vious but nonetheless equally costly in terms of limiting defense coun-
sel's options. For example, there may be facts about the offense that
reflect something stigmatizing about the victim-, such as homosexual-
ity, extramarital sexual activity, prostitution, or drug use. While these
facts could mitigate the moral culpability of the defendant, or even
cast doubt on whether a particular homicide was death-eligible, 291 de-
fense counsel may elect to forego the potential benefits out of fear
that presenting those facts may spur relatives to "defend" the reputa-
tion of the victim through victim impact testimony.
Moreover, even when defense counsel does not forego presenting
mitigating information, victim impact testimony may skew the
factfinding process because such testimony is difficult for the defense
to rebut. For example, the Payne majority dismissed concerns that the
State may present inaccurate testimony without challenge, reasoning
that "the mere fact that for tactical reasons it might not be prudent for
the defense to rebut victim impact evidence makes the case no differ-
ent than others in which a party is faced with this sort of a dilemma."30
Lest the reader of Payne think that capital sentencing proceedings re-
quire enhanced reliability, as the cases on the right to present mitigat-
29 For example, kidnapping is generally an aggravating factor that renders a homicide
death-eligible. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(c)(1)(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2001). If
defense counsel can show the existence of a prior relationship between victim and defen-
dant, she may be able to cast doubt as to whether the victim indeed was kidnapped.
30 Payne, 501 U.S. at 823.
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ing evidence hold,31 the Court quickly points to its holding in Barefoot
v. Estelle,32 which permits a court to admit testimony on future danger-
ousness despite the American Psychiatric Association's assertion as
amicus curiae that "'[t]he unreliability of psychiatric prediction of
long-term future dangerousness is by now an established fact within
the profession.' 33
While I would never defend Barefoot, it does seem to me that the
Payne Court overstates that decision. Although expert testimony on
future dangerousness and victim impact testimony are both suscepti-
ble to claims of unreliability, the problem with victim impact testi-
mony is not merely that it is unreliable. Rather, the testimony is
biased in a way unlikely to be susceptible to cross-examination. At
least defense counsel could ask "Dr. Death," the notorious psychiatrist
involved in Barefoot, about his proclivity for testifying for the prosecu-
tion, the errors he had made in the past, the position of the American
Psychiatric Association on future dangerousness predictions, and the
fact that his profession had already disciplined him. In contrast, vic-
tim family members have no such objective history, and exploring
their possible motives to fabricate is unlikely to be a productive use of
cross-examination. It is of no benefit to the defense when a victim's
spouse concedes that she exaggerated her husband's good traits be-
cause she wants his killer to get the death penalty. Moreover, if the
family member does not desire revenge, but instead wants the public
to remember the deceased in a positive light, it is even harder to imag-
ine how defense counsel could successfully explore that desire.
Thus, victim impact testimony will often thwart the factfinding
process, either by denying the jury useful mitigating information or by
creating inaccurate aggravating information. Moreover, despite the
Payne majority's protest that the purpose of victim impact testimony is
not to compare the relative worth of victims, it would seem to be an
inevitable consequence. As a comprehensive General Accounting Of-
fice report concludes, the race of the victim is frequently a component
of the decision to seek-and impose-the death penalty. 34 Any pro-
cedure that makes race more salient is likely to increase racial dispari-
ties, and victim impact testimony will underline the racial identity of
-1 See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-11 (1982) (indicating that the
need for heightened reliability and individualized decision making in capital sentencing
prevents the state from precluding consideration of any relevant mitigating factor); Lock-
ett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978) (same); see also Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37
(1986) (holding that the need for heightened reliability in capital sentencing proceedings
requires that the state permit a capital defendant accused of an interracial crime to ques-
tion potential jurors about racial bias).
32 463 U.S. 880, 896-97 (1983).
33 Id. at 920 (citation omitted).
34 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDI-
CATES PArERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 5-7 (1990).
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the victim himself or herself, as well as inform the jury of the race of
all of the subsidiary "victims" affected by the homicide.
Finally, there are countless other unanticipated irrationalities
that victim impact testimony introduces. For example, it is bizarre to
think that whether Jeff Ardis and Linda Timmerman held themselves
out as a married couple should determine whether she is the voice
that speaks for the victim, and therefore, whether Shanan lives or
dies.35 It is equally unnerving to contemplate that whether the vic-
tim's wife is pretty or articulate could determine whether the State
executes a defendant. Capital sentencing inevitably involves some ar-
bitrariness, but victim impact testimony vastly enhances the potential
for irrationality, without substantially increasing the information a
jury has about the harm the defendant's actions caused.
C. Redux: Who's the Driver Anyway?
Thus, Shanan Ardis's case endorses the wisdom of Booth and Gath-
ers, in that victim impact testimony diverted attention from the issue of
the defendant's moral culpability. Assuming, however, that at least in
the short run, a return to the Booth rule is as likely as a return to the
ideological predispositions of the Booth Court, I draw two modest
lessons.
The first lesson is that the system should not allow "victim assis-
tance" personnel to take the wheel. In many jurisdictions, victim assis-
tance programs are under the umbrella of the prosecutor's office.
Whether this is problematic in noncapital cases, I cannot say. In capi-
tal cases, however, the prosecution, by definition, is committed to
seeking a death sentence, even though it may not be in the interest of
the victim's family members. Indeed, I think it most often is not in
the family's best interest because, as Dr. Halleck suggested, the death
penalty negatively affects the grieving process. Furthermore, even
when a capital prosecution is certain to go forward, it may not be in
the interest of a family member to testify in the capital sentencing
proceeding. It certainly is not in the best interest of a victim's family
member to be pressured into doing so, as obviously occurred in the
Ardis case. If the person the State assigns to provide "assistance" to
the victims is affiliated with the prosecution, such pressure is
predictable.
In addition, beyond the question of institutional loyalty is the is-
sue of training. That is, it is important for the State's representatives
to avoid injection of their own ideas and "facts" through suggestive
questioning. This is a lesson that we should have learned in dealing
with child sexual abuse cases. Ideally, the State should train such per-
35 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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sonnel to be neutral, to facilitate the expression of the victim's family
members' views-whatever those views may be-and to support the
family during the trial in whatever way family members want support.
Or, if such evenhanded support proves impossible, the State could
staff the office with persons of varying viewpoints. All of this, of
course, assumes that the State really designed "victim assistance" to aid
the victim, rather than to assist in its quest for death. If the latter is a
more accurate description of the purpose of victim assistance pro-
grams, then truth in packaging is in order.
D. At Least Take the Car out of Reverse
My next proposal might surprise the reader: Assuming victim im-
pact testimony is here for the foreseeable future, we should at least let
the victim's family members explicitly state their preferences. While I
disagree with Beloof's assertion that they should have a right to do
so,36 it seems that direct statements of preference are more likely to
be helpful than indirect attempts to steer the jury toward death. In
part, I say this because such statements are unlikely to significantly
increase the odds of death; juries already infer the wishes of family
members from their testimony in the penalty phase. Obviously, courts
would prevent the inflammatory expression of such preferences, but
forbidding victim impact testimony entirely seems pointless.
Moreover, a law permitting family members to express prefer-
ences would actually better balance the process; families that do not
want the State to impose the death penalty would have an opportunity
to say so, whereas they currently have no way of expressing this wish to
the jury. It seems counterproductive indeed that a jury might decide
to impose the death penalty based, in part, on the assumption that it
will aid the family, when in fact the death penalty will prolong their
ordeal or cause more grief. And in the unusual case in which the
victim had expressed a general opposition to the death penalty or a
desire that the State not seek the death penalty in the event he or she
were to be murdered, the jury should be informed of those views, lest
they impose revenge in the name of one who would have renounced
it.
CONCLUSION
Payne melds together the pleas of victim family members who
want to be heard and the voices of prosecutors seeking another tool to
obtain death sentences. The Payne holding may please prosecutors,
but I do not think it serves victims' family members' interests, and I
know that it distorts capital sentencing proceedings in bizarre ways.
36 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
2003]
568 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:555
At the least, the Court should tinker with Payne so that it distorts less
and satisfies more. Better yet, we should completely separate the tacti-
cal considerations of prosecutors from the psychological needs of vic-
tims. If what victim family members want is a formal opportunity to
speak well of the person they lost, or to confront the defendant with
their losses, or even to voice their feelings toward the defendant, the
system can and probably should accommodate those desires-but not
as part of the procedure that determines whether the defendant lives
or dies.
